Due to the geographically dispersed initial array of British holdings, playing Great Britain well in the early years involves hemispheric-scale diplomacy. Continuing success for Great Britain requires taking advantage of the power’s unrivaled flexibility to shift efforts around the board as some campaigns progress and others stall or fail. On the positive side, Great Britain uniquely begins with five centers (the others have at most four). However, to offset this raw numerical advantage, British holdings are scattered across three rough north to south zones. This ranges from the Canadian north, to the Caribbean middle, and ends with a single center in the deep southern portion of the board. This gives Britain plausible interests in multiple regions, and impacts the fortunes of nearly every other power on the board as the British player attempts to negotiate a prosperous 1841.
With this in mind, the countries of greatest initial concern for Britain are the United States and Spain. The growth paths of these two nations (especially Spain) are nearly impossible to disentangle from the British path to success. Therefore, careful negotiation of the relationships with these two nations is critical. This is how the British player will consolidate a defensible position while keeping up with the growth pace of competitors. The one center in the south can consume a lot of diplomatic attention, but is not so strategically important. Because of Britain’s disadvantageously dispersed geographic position, British players must find a way to generate a stable position while also ensuring that both the United States and Spain’s same objectives don’t lead to inherent, and eventually exploitable, geographic weakness for Britain.
MAP CONSIDERATIONS
North Atlantic Ocean
With North Atlantic’s Ocean’s large size and access to Canadian home centers, its importance to Great Britain cannot be overstated. Britain’s two Canadian home centers, Halifax and Montreal, are easily accessible from an enemy fleet in the North Atlantic—which can include Brazil if Britain is not careful. Moreover, Britain most efficiently accesses and defends Greenland (a neutral center that nearly always falls to Britain first) with a firm hold on the North Atlantic Ocean. Simply put, the North Atlantic Ocean is the key to maintaining control of Canada. Finally, the North Atlantic Ocean is part of a trifecta of water provinces that Britain later uses to stifle enemy fleet movement. (The other two sea zones are Mid Atlantic Ocean and South Pacific Ocean)
Erie Canal/Eastern Great Lakes
These two provinces are the key crossing points for early American or British players when making attacks on each other. Britain must consider these as part of diplomatic negotiation and/or military control to ensure that America is not able to get a jump on attacking Britain’s Canadian holdings. This is why we feel it is important to look at them as a pair.
The Erie Canal touches two American home centers, Washington D.C. and New York City, while affording American players access to Montreal. Attacks against British Canadian territories nearly always involved movement through the Erie Canal. The Eastern Great Lakes usually has less immediate relevancy, since no American fleet initially borders it). Later, it can become a powerful forking province for either a U.S. or British fleet since it touches four supply centers and the Erie Canal. Moreover, Britain must monitor a constant source of vulnerability: the U.S. can build a fleet on the west coast of Washington DC.
East Caribbean
The East Caribbean is the linking province between the two British Caribbean home centers, Jamaica and Trinidad. It also contacts four additional centers, one Venezuelan, one Spanish, and two neutral centers. Britain must establish control of this province to have a reasonable prospect of a stable Caribbean position. This is no small feat due to competition with Spain and Venezuela. The difficulty is that Spain and Venezuela both have the same view, and the Spanish view is nearly as weighty given challenges in Spain maintaining control of their own islands holdings. In short, three different powers seen this providence as highly important—and therefore, hotly contest it. This doesn’t lessen the importance to Britain of course, but does present a negotiating challenge.
Sargasso Sea/Mid Atlantic Ocean
Like the Erie Canal and Eastern Great Lakes, these two locations can naturally be discussed together as linked provinces necessary for Britain to join four of their five home centers together. The British player will almost certain have to control this region to have any prospect of soloing. As mentioned earlier with regards to the North Atlantic Ocean, the Mid Atlantic Ocean and (to a lesser degree) Sargasso Sea are important for controlling fleet movement through the Atlantic. While Mid Atlantic Ocean and Sargasso Sea control may not come quickly, they must come for success.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Avoiding a Mexico-U.S. Alliance
Mexico and the United States often challenge each other over the fate of Texas in 1841. By observing how they resolve the conflict, the British player can get an early read on the state of affairs between the two nations. Neither nation needs to necessarily attack one another to obtain a solo victory. However, the path to one for Mexico usually involves capturing at least Texas, New Orleans, and Chicago. With the United States, a solo is even more likely to involve seizing lands to the west of New Orleans due to the closer of those lands to U.S. home supply centers.
For Britain, unity between Mexico and the U.S. makes it much more likely that the U.S. will move towards Canada. This is especially true at the beginning of the game. The U.S. retaining even a modest level of uncertainty of Mexican intentions may help Great Britain to build a solid foundation between all of its centers as the game progresses. Britain should exploit the overlapping territorial ambition between the U.S. and Mexico during negotiations. Use that to cut short any friendliness between them.
Disentangling from Spain
The issue of entanglement with Spain is nearly unresolvable. Rarely are nations so geographically at odds as are the Spanish and the British. Fortunately for Britain, a stable Canadian presence can offset a devastating conflict with Spain. The most likely “success” story between Britain and Spain is deferral. Britain is almost certain to get into conflict with Spain. However, the immediate need to survive and find some stability is in the best interest of both powers. On this basis alone, Britain and Spain can forestall conflict in the earlier years—enabling both to find some footing. This may afford Britain the opportunity to suggest a North/South split in the Caribbean between the two powers. This would include conceding Bahamas, Santo Domingo, and Haiti to Spain. In return, Britain gains a province like Nicaragua and the space to focus on East Caribbean and the NG/Venezuelan coastline.
Making short-to-medium-term deals may allow Britain to supercharge their Canadian zone (in preparation for a strike on the United States). Or it could set up Britain to strike Spain early (by maintaining peace with the United States and slanting builds towards the Caribbean). Ultimately, the relationship between Spain and Britain offers a great challenge to even the most seasoned diplomatic masters.
The Deep South (Malvinas and the South Atlantic Ocean)
Britain’s single home supply center in the south is often a strategic afterthought. Britain’s ability to project power with a single unit is limited amongst the consolidated homelands of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. These other nations often block any British non-diplomatic force projection in this area with a bigger show of force. This means that the key to the south are diplomacy and a little bit of luck, not raw military power. Britain will not be able to resist these other nation’s militaries with force alone.
The early target for Britain in this zone is Patagonia. Chile is often looking to Easter Island and Antofagasta primarily. Argentina, curious about Brazil’s southward intent, is often distracted from Britain’s single unit. If Britain can obtain and keep Patagonia, it presents an additional build option. This can help Britain’s overall strategy, or be used to preserve Britain’s hold in the south until the mid-game. Often this means holding the Falkland Current between these two territories while the conflicts are resolved among the other powers. Meanwhile, Britain is looking for other diplomatic opportunities as those conflicts are resolved.
Strategically, Britain’s main objective in the South is to preserve access to the Atlantic maritime highway (NAO, MAO, and SAO). Doing this will enable Britain to project power in all three spheres of the map. The British hold of the deep south is tenuous, but success there can facilitate Britain’s grander ambitions.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Greenland and the Far North
Greenland and the North Atlantic Ocean are the anchoring points for ensuring tactical stability for Great Britain’s northern interests. The North Atlantic Ocean prevents turning Britain’s northwestern flank and keeps Britain a corner power. Losing it greatly complicates the tactical calculations that Britain must make about an opponent’s movements. Conversely, holding it simplifies those calculations. Abutting the Mid Atlantic Ocean and Sargasso Sea also allows quicker transit between Great Britain’s zones of influence. Without securing NAO and Greenland, Britain’s entire position is up in the air and the tactical danger will remain high from turn to turn that Britain will lose control of Canada.
Erie Canal/East Great Lakes
While an enemy unit in Erie Canal is a bigger threat to the United States than Britain, a U.S. unit in Erie Canal will ensure conflict between Britain and the U.S. which will consume valuable resources. Moreover, it will hinder British occupation of Toronto during the first year which is a critical British gain. More often lately, a bounce between Montreal and New York City is seen as a safe first move for both sides. After the first year, Britain needs to use significant diplomatic efforts to ensure that the U.S. sees the concern in the Caribbean and Atlantic seaboards as a higher priority then a build on the West Coast of Washington D.C. Moreover, Britain needs to keep an eye out for the army in Chicago trying an end-run around the Great Lakes into Ontario.
The Caribbean Scramble
With Spain, Britain’s homelands are subject to what can be termed “the Caribbean scramble” for its relatively fluid state of affairs. The Caribbean centers are nearly impossible to stabilize control over until a power has not just taken them, but moved firmly beyond them. Because of the multiplicity of ways to break a power’s control on them, the tactical difficulties inherent in securing the area counsel a player to move firmly and quickly through them so as to shorten the time during which they are struggling for control of them.
Tactically speaking, maintaining control of the zone is a nightmare. Approach the issue carefully, quickly, and decisively to avoid tactical reversals. Much will center on the control over East Caribbean but debates with Spain over North Caribbean and Venezuela over Cumana/Trinidad will be on the top of the “To Do” list for Britain once the game gets started. While Nicaragua make look tempting, keeping the two fleets in a position to assist the other during the first year may prove of higher tactical importance.
The Falklands
Diplomacy is the key in the south. Foment tension between Argentina and Brazil to keep Argentina looking north while Chile is pushed to remain in the Pacific. Unfortunately, one additional power usually will try and contest for Patagonia. Thus, Britain must choose: fight for that additional center, or pick a side to get protection for the Falklands. If Britain is lucky to pick up Patagonia, it could mean a fourth build for Britain, enabling a second fleet build in the south. Otherwise, the existing southern fleet will have to sit in Falklands Current. This gives leverage over Patagonia while protecting the Falklands (and ultimately South Atlantic Ocean).
VICTORY CONSIDERATIONS
Great Britain generally solos through domination of the northeast corner of the board and expansion outwards from there. This is the most natural route to victory. Four of the British home centers are located in this quadrant. Builds and deployments there are almost always the priority.
The large sizes of the Atlantic border sea zones afford an adventurous Britain the opportunity to expand in multiple directions. Britain can push units around the top of the board through the Arctic Ocean area. They can also push down toward the South Atlantic Ocean into the Southern Hemisphere. This does give multiple expansion options for Britain to consider. But in practice, Britain’s anchoring in the northeast quadrant, combined with the ability to quickly dominate the Atlantic maritime highway of NAO, MAO, and SAO and builds centers in all three spheres of the board, will likely place most focus on the eastern half of the map (perhaps using the Falklands home center to obtain coastal centers on the southern half of South America).
Overall, for Great Britain to be successful, Britain must successfully negotiate the relationships with Spain and the United States. At a minimum, Britain must deal with the United States to overcome the weakness of a dispersed starting position. This will ensure a stable position for the mid-game expansion into America or the Caribbean. To do this, Britain must limit the growth of Spain and the United States. The United States is the power most able to break Britain’s stable northeast corner position. Ultimate victory almost certainly runs through Spain.
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