You’ve Never Used Turkey’s Best Opening15 min read

I was not able to play in the 2019 Online Diplomacy Championship, but I was still following the tournament and of course the top board. With the end now upon us, one thing that jumped out at me was that you were Turkey. I had been wondering for the entire game who Turkey was. Why the entire game? Because the Turkish opening struck me right from the beginning—it’s one that I really like (in fact I played it when I got Turkey in the 2017 ODC) but that I’m pretty sure has long been considered “unconventional” or “fringe”. However, I think it’s really sound!

Before talking about what you actually played in Spring 01 and why, maybe let’s make sure we agree on this: do you consider your opening to have been unconventional? What, in your mind, is the “conventional wisdom” about Turkish opening theory?

Thanks for the affirmation. Despite my poor start, and despite my eventual elimination, I think I played a strong game as Turkey. I’ll be sure to publish an After Action Report detailing my perspective on the whole match. But for now, I’m excited to discuss my choice of opening moves. I know why you were intrigued by my Turkish opening.

I’d like to break down the conventional wisdom on Turkish opening theory piece by piece:

The army at Constantinople. The conventional wisdom is that this piece must move to Bulgaria. I agree with this thinking, as a move to Bulgaria typically guarantees a build for Turkey, antagonizes nobody, and gives Turkey follow-up options.  Moving Constantinople anywhere else is probably a grave error. I can only see myself not moving CON to BUL as part of a strategic ploy to appear as a fool.

The fleet at Ankara. The conventional wisdom is that this piece must move to Black Sea (either to bounce Russia or perhaps as a surprise attack) or else to Constantinople (to get the fleet into the Mediterranean ASAP, usually in furtherance of an alliance with Russia). I agree with this thinking, as whatever goals might be accomplished with the other options (hold; move to Armenia) can be accomplished better by moving to CON or BLA. (For example, arranging a bounce with Russia in Black Sea is almost always smarter than both players agreeing to just hold with their fleets.

The army at Smyrna. The conventional wisdom is that this piece must move to Constantinople (to be able to backfill Bulgaria, in case Bulgaria moves somewhere in Autumn) or else to Armenia (typically to attack Russia, or sometimes as insurance against a Russian attack if Turkey opens by moving the fleet at ANK to CON). These are both reasonable choices.

I do consider the opening I used in the ODC 2019 Finals to be unconventional. As you know, I opened by moving CON to BUL, ANK to BLA….and SMY to ANK.

Piece by piece is also my preferred way to break things down!  But I look at it as a chain of decisions, not just totally independent movements.

Tracing through what you wrote about the conventional wisdom, it seems like you’re claiming that when Turkey opens Ank – Con, the Smyrna army should always go to Armenia. My own personal opinion aside, I think that that is not conventional wisdom, based both on things I’ve read and how I’ve seen other people play that opening. But let’s table that for the time being, because as you said, you didn’t play Ank – Con anyway. Everything else you said, I agree with, from the part about moving Con – Bul (I consider that the most automatic opening move in the game), to the part about Ankara only having two legitimate options, and then the part about Smyrna’s usual options when moving Ank – Bla. I also agree that both Armenia and Constantinople have their place as reasonable options for the Smyrna army.

Now let’s get to your opening. This is one of those cases where I think just knowing the moves is not enough to understand what’s really happening. One reason I say that is because I remember the first time I ever played those moves in Spring 01. In that game, the Russian player moved Sev – Arm, allowing me into the Black Sea and Ankara.  I then played Ank – Arm supported by Bla in Fall; Russia blew up his fleet, rebuilt it as an army, and then we started rolling the board after I convoyed Armenia away from the Russian border in 1902. That is a very unconventional joint opening known as the Slingshot Juggernaut.

On the other hand, when I played the same moves in ODC 2017, the intention was completely different. I knew that the Black Sea move would bounce with Russia (we had discussed it), and thus, I expected Smy – Ank to bounce as well. It was basically a “throwaway” move; my real intention was for the army not to move. This is an entirely different idea, to the point that I don’t even consider these the same opening, even though the moves are identical!

I suspect that when you played this opening, it fell into the latter category. After all, you bounced with Russia in the Black Sea, and in a game such as the ODC top board, such a bounce was probably talked about beforehand, right? So your opening in this game seems like it was the same idea as my ODC 2017 game.

Now, conventional wisdom says that if you have arranged a bounce in Black Sea, and you are not hostile to Russia (meaning you have no reason to go to Armenia), the only viable choice is to move Smy – Con. I have my own answer to this question, but I want to hear yours: why did you pass on moving to Con, especially since (as we both agree) it is a reasonable choice for the army under certain circumstances?

I did expect Russia to bounce me in Black Sea that game, and so I basically knew that Smyrna was going to wind up holding. I passed on moving Smyrna to Constantinople despite the short-term tactical opportunity cost. Indeed, holding with Smyrna forgoes two potentially-valuable tactical follow-ups (moving to BUL or SEV in Autumn 1901). But the hold confers an immediate diplomatic advantage as well as a tactical advantage in the form of options.

Let me describe the tactical options first because that plays into the diplomacy. 

First, the army at Smyrna can still move to Constantinople or Armenia in Autumn. This means Turkey hasn’t committed to moving that army west or east (while the typical Spring move to CON or ARM does commit Turkey somewhat; it certainly sends a signal to players who try to read the board). But perhaps more importantly, Turkey can move the fleet at Ankara to either Black Sea (perhaps occupying, perhaps bouncing Russia a second time) or to Constantinople while leaving Smyrna free to build a second fleet. 

When Turkey moves SMY to CON in Spring 1901 while bouncing Russia in Black Sea, Turkey chooses a position from which it is very difficult to have two fleets in the Mediterranean at the end of 1901. This is because Turkey’s fleet at Ankara can only move to Constantinople if Turkey can somehow move the army at CON somewhere else. Moving CON to ANK doesn’t work, because units can’t swap positions. And although moving CON to SMY will succeed, it defeats the goal of getting two fleets into the Mediterranean (since Turkey can’t build a second fleet in either CON or SMY when they are both occupied).

This leaves only 1 option, and it’s a crummy one: move BUL somewhere and hope to backfill BUL with the army at CON. This is a crummy option because—let’s be real here—BUL rarely succeeds in going anywhere in Autumn 1901; Turkey is likely to move BUL, CON to BUL and ANK to CON, only for all three orders to fail in a chain reaction.

But by leaving CON empty at the start of Autumn 1901 (by holding with Smyrna) Turkey has a guaranteed way to move ANK to CON and build a fleet in SMY (the army at SMY can move to ANK or ARM of course).

In my opinion, giving up the tactical ability to backfill BUL in Autumn 1901 is a very small price to pay, because BUL rarely succeeds in moving anywhere anyways in Autumn 1901 (since Turkey can easily be boxed in, and wise players are reluctant to help Turkey get 2 builds in 1901). The tactical gain on the following turn (in terms of options) is pretty large by comparison.

And these tactical options give Turkey serious bargaining power in the east. Italy, Austria, and Russia can all see that Turkey did not commit to any particular plan in Spring 1901, but could easily initiate attacks on Russia or initiate a two-mediterranean-fleet Juggernaut in Autumn 1901. This gives Turkey more diplomatic cards to play than the committal openings most players favor. (Or I might say, one card to play over the usual zero!).

So what I wanted to accomplish was to get my neighbors talking with me. I wanted them to spend their energy trying to influence my choices, trying to get a deal with me, trying to be my ally—instead of spending their effort responding to intentions telegraphed by my moves.

Also, for that match in particular, I wanted to obscure my identity. I had never before discussed this opening on my blog, and to my recollection I had never played it before on webDiplomacy.