Post-Game Analysis

This article contains my post-game analysis of the French player's performance during a match we played together in the 2019 Online Diplomacy Championship (Round 1, Game 4). I kept a journal during the match that records my thoughts as the game unfolded. This article stands on its own, but is probably easier to understand if you are familiar with my journal.

Whenever I finish a game (not just Diplomacy, but any game or competition I enter), I take some time to review the completed match. I believe that I have become a formidable adversary in many forms of competition because I habitually analyze my finished matches.

I think few people reflect on games that they finish, and I think even fewer evaluate their opponents' decisions. In my opinion, missing out on this learning opportunity is why so many people have a hard time improving at games. If you want to become a great player at any game, I urge you to perform this kind of analysis after you finish each match.

An Autopsy of France

France was eliminated in Autumn 1903, an astonishingly fast defeat for France.

This is what the board looked like immediately after the Autumn 1903 moves.

I consider France to be the second-strongest defensive power in Diplomacy (second to Turkey). I have played many matches where France came under attack from multiple powers right away, yet France lingered for many years (and sometimes recovered!). To survive while under attack, however, the French player must make use of France's defensive tactical advantages.

In my match, England, Germany, and Italy cut through France like hot knives through butter. What went wrong here for this French player?

I can sum up France's loss in a single image:

This is the worst opening I've seen for France in my entire life.

This is a screenshot of the opening moves (chosen in Spring 1901, but appearing on the Autumn 1901 map). After these opening moves, England and Germany acquired the ability to prevent France from getting any builds at all in 1901 (which is exactly what we did). I think that this opening made France extremely weak and easy to attack, which sealed France's fate.

True, Germany and I (England) already hatched a plan to cooperate against France, but if France had put up a strong defense, France might have had time to create a tactical situation that encouraged one of us to betray the other. Usually, it takes time and strong defensive play to break up an alliance.

In my experience, Diplomacy players often behave like sharks that go into a feeding frenzy once they smell blood. Once it was clear that France's centers were up for grabs (since France couldn't defend them, due to getting no build), the strategies for England, Germany and Italy converged on who would get France's centers, not whether to attack France.

The French Player Made 3 Critical Errors

Error #1: Failing to Move an Army to Burgundy

In my opinion, the French player should have opened by moving an army to Burgundy. I don't care about what any other person says about opening moves for France: I think France is almost always better off moving an army into Burgundy in 1901. To be clear, I'm not applying hindsight; I'm not saying France should have moved an army into Burgundy because the French player should have foreseen the German move. I'm saying that France should have moved to Burgundy no matter what -- even if France intended to ally Germany!

Positioning an army in Burgundy is tactically, strategically, and diplomatically powerful. From Burgundy (as opposed to Picardy), France has more power to manipulate the dynamic between England and Germany. Tactically, France has the ability to strike at Munich, move on Belgium, or support either rivals' unit into Belgium (ideally, in return for something).

Furthermore, France placing an army into Burgundy often scares Germany into letting Russia take Sweden in 1901 -- especially if England does not open into English Channel (don't overlook the fact that most English players do not open to English Channel).

As France, you usually want Germany to permit Russia to acquire Sweden in 1901. Russia is your natural ally, and helping Russia gain a foothold in Scandinavia creates short and long-term problems for your natural enemies England and Germany. To encourage Germany to allow Russia into Sweden, France should strive to make Germany concerned that England might attack Germany, or even to make Germany fear that there is an England/France alliance forming.

I am sure this advice seems counter-intuitive, but I believe this strategy to be very effective. The counter-intuitive nature of this strategy will preclude Germany from understanding what you are trying to do.

No player, and especially not Germany, should be completely trusted in Spring 1901. When you play as France, Germany will say damn near anything to keep you from opening to Burgundy, whether or not Germany is friendly. Accordingly, you should not trust any such messages. Risking the integrity of your defense of your home centers in return for "I'll be your best friend!" is not wise. In fact, I think that the typical German player will actually try even harder to gain France's favor if France opens to Burgundy. I really do, read on!

I think inexperienced players commonly apply this dysfunctional heuristic: "To gain my rival's favor, I need to move all of my units consistent with that rival's goals and expectations." If you believe that moving all your units away from another player will turn that player into your best friend, you are naive. In many situations, the opposite is likely to be true; doing everything another player wants you to do makes you the optimum target for a backstab. I often criticize this style of play as being a "servile ally."

The danger of "servile ally" play manifested during this match: France obviously promised Germany that there would be no move to Burgundy, and Germany returned the favor by all-out attacking France.

Additional thoughts:

If, as France, you intend to ally Germany, I advise you to warn Germany of your intention to move an army to Burgundy. The German player may huff about your decision, but either 1) they're bluffing; 2) they'll get over it; or 3) they're a prima donna and would have made a poor ally anyways.
If you really really feel like you have concocted a strong plan that involves not opening to Burgundy, for the love of God don't tell Germany that you will leave Burgundy wide open. Imply that you will block Burgundy somehow (e.g., that you will self-bounce Paris and Marseilles) so that Germany hesitates to risk wasting move by opening with Munich to Burgundy.

Error #2: Moving an Army to Piedmont

I think the French player should not have opened to Piedmont. In my opinion, it doesn't matter if Italy flat-out tells you "I'm moving to Piedmont!" -- it's rarely worth wasting a move on Piedmont.

The main problem is that if your army at Marseilles actually does end up in Piedmont, you'll likely be in bad shape. As evidenced by this match, Piedmont is a terrible position for the French army to be in after the first turn. That position is almost useless; a French army at Piedmont in Autumn 1901 can't capture any neutral centers and cannot, alone, successfully attack Italy.

Further, if there is no German army in Burgundy, it is trivial for France to defend Marseilles against any 1901 Italian attack from Piedmont. Thus, the risk to France in permitting an Italian move into Piedmont should be very small (if you assume that France has prevented the German army from getting into Burgundy). Accordingly, blocking an Italian army from moving to Piedmont on Spring 1901 should be a low priority.

I concede that my recommendation here makes the most sense when taken together with my earlier recommendation to open to Burgundy. I might say that another advantage of keeping Germany out of Burgundy is that there is no need to cover Piedmont if Burgundy is sure to be protected.

Error #3: Failure to Gain at Least One Neighbor-Ally

In my opinion, the French player's effort to gain alliance with me was rather minimal. Not only did France put in a small diplomatic effort at the beginning of the match, but France failed to put in the increased effort usually needed to turn things around diplomatically. Once it was apparent that an England-Germany alliance existed, France needed to pry off either England or Germany from that alliance and/or persuade Italy to stop attacking. If France's efforts towards me are representative (and, to be fair, I don't know what France said to Germany or Italy), then France did not put in the effort needed to salvage the situation.

The French player could have tried to power up England (me). England is inherently stronger than Germany due to being a corner power, and so in any English/German alliance, the German player has to be far more wary of England than the English player has to be of Germany. Assisting the strongest member of an enemy alliance is a powerful tactic for breaking up that alliance: the imbalance will scare the weaker ally and tempt the stronger player into backstabbing.

Example: France could have asked me (England) to take Brest and then call off the attack. This can be an effective defensive play. You say something like "Listen England, if I cede you Brest, I'll no longer be a threat do you. I'll let you have that center so long as you take Brest with your fleet. Please let me concentrate against Germany/Italy." Some English players will take that offer, knowing that once France is limited in this way, Germany is the juicier target.

The French player could also have tried to power up Germany. Although it is tactically more difficult for France to power up Germany than to power up England (you have to think of something you can actually do, as France, that helps Germany), the comparative advantage is that Germany is less likely to come after all the French centers in the long run. England is so inherently strong as a corner power, and such a natural enemy of France, that powering up England necessarily playing with fire.

R.I.P. France

Because France got smashed so early and easily after this unfortunate opening, it's hard for me to evaluate the overall capabilities of the player. Perhaps the French player would have performed poorly no matter the opening, since I am a strong player and was doing everything in my power to bring France down. But even if the French player were one of the best in the entire world, it would have been extremely difficult to recover from the opening. Let this be a lesson in the importance of making a conservative, safe opening.

You Can Avoid the French Player's Mistakes

In my opinion, this is the strongest French opening:

The army at Paris move to Burgundy
The army at Marseilles support move to Burgundy from Paris
The fleet at Brest move to Mid-Atlantic Ocean

This opening is a perfect mix of offense and defense. Even if attacked by England, Germany, and Italy all on the first turn, France is assured to get at least 1 build and stands a reasonable chance of getting 2 builds. Specifically, France can make the following follow-up moves:

Mid-Atlantic Ocean move to Portugal (+1 SC)
Burgundy move to Marseilles (guards against any Italian attack)
Marseilles move to Spain (+1 SC)

Unless England opens to English Channel, this plan is guaranteed to result in 2 builds for France. Even if England opens to English Channel, the worst that can happen is that England conquers Brest and/or convoys an army into France -- and in that case, France still gets 1 build.

Offensively, this opening gives France enormous potential and many strategic options. These options include:

The ability to use the fleet at Mid-Atlantic Ocean to pick up Portugal (neutral move) or Spain (pro-England, anti-Italian);
The ability to move Burgundy into Belgium or to support England's or Germany's move into Belgium;
The ability to attack Munich either by moving into Munich or supporting a crazy early-game Russian or Italian attack (which happens more often than you might think).

This maybe goes beyond the scope of this article, so I'll keep this point short: I think a strong-yet-simple strategy for France in press games is to bait England into throwing everything eastward in 1901 and 1902 and then attack England from behind in 1902 or 1903. My recommended opening is the perfect opening for executing this powerful strategy because the moves appear to be friendly to England for the first year without actually committing to anything. You can promise the moon to England, and then decide whether you want to keep that promise after seeing how the board shapes up during the first two turns.

Because I believe that this opening is so strong in almost every offensive or defensive situation, I have a strong presumption in favor of making this opening. I am also extremely reluctant to give any player my full trust on the very first turn. I am willing to deviate from this opening, but only if a potential ally seems extremely credible and makes a strong case for a specific, powerful tactical plan that can only be executed if I were to move differently. In other words, I would never leave Burgundy open in return for Germany's "I'll be your best friend!" promise.

Hey... isn't that a gunboat opening?

I appreciate that my recommended French opening for Press Diplomacy is also the dominant French opening in the Gunboat Diplomacy metagame, which some readers will perceive as a red flag against the quality of my advice (gunboat rules forbid the players from sending written messages, so the gameplay is very different from traditional Press Diplomacy). Indeed, I am often accused by other Diplomacy commentators of being overly gunboat-minded in my analysis of Press Diplomacy. To those critics I say: you are insufficiently gunboat-minded.

In my frank opinion, the "I'll try any move, any plan, so long as my ally seems trustworthy!" approach to Diplomacy is weak. I believe that mastering the objective (i.e., board-based) constraints of Diplomacy, and then allowing that mastery to inform your press, will help you reach your full competitive potential as a Diplomacy player. I intend to write more about this topic in my "Solo Win Tips" series, and I'll come back and add a link when I do.

If the French player had made a safer opening, it would have been possible for the French player to put up a spirited defense, buying the time needed to break up the anti-French alliance or for a distant power to come to France's rescue. And when England, Germany, and/or Italy do not attack France at the outset, my suggested opening is still strong because it allows France to pick up Portugal and Spain while also having an influence over Belgium and possibly even Munich.

An Autopsy of France: Lessons from the ODC13 min read